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Abstract 
 
The employment of financial development indicators without due consideration to 
country/regional specific financial development realities remains an issue of substantial policy 
relevance. Financial depth in the perspective of money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities 
in every development context.  This paper introduces complementary indicators to the 
existing Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD). Dynamic panel system 
GMM estimations are applied. Different specifications, non-overlapping intervals and control 
variables are used to check the consistency of estimated coefficients. Our results suggest that 
from an absolute standpoint (GDP base measures), all financial sectors are pro-poor. 
However, three interesting findings are drawn from measures of sector importance. (1) The 
expansion of the formal financial sector to the detriment of other financial sectors has a 
disequalizing income effect. (2) Growth of informal and semi-formal financial sectors at the 
expense of the formal financial sector has an income equalizing effect. (3) The positive 
income redistributive effect of semi-formal finance in financial sector competition is higher 
than the corresponding impact of informal finance. It unites two streams of research by 
contributing at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial 
development and responding to the growing field of economic development by means of 
informal financial sector promotion and microfinance. The paper suggests a practicable way 
to disentangle the effects of the various financial sectors on economic development. The 
equation of financial depth in the perspective of money supply to liquid liabilities has put on 
the margin the burgeoning informal financial sector in developing countries. The phenomenon 
of mobile banking is such an example.  
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1. Introduction  
 Poverty and inequality remain daunting challenges in developing countries despite 
close to three decades of financial reforms. In spite of this substantial policy relevant concern, 
inequality related studies have not been critically engaged in these countries due to lack 
and/or scarcity of relevant data (Kai & Hamori, 2009). Accordingly, many developing 
countries embarked on a chain of structural adjustment policies in the financial sector as part 
of reforms in the economic sector with the ambitious goals of mitigating inequality, 
enhancing economic prosperity and improving financial efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 
1991). These reforms led to the adoption of some financial indicators that do not exhaustively 
calibrate the policy needs of poverty and/or inequality mitigation (Asongu, 2013a).  
 The employment of financial development indicators without due consideration to 
country/regional specific financial development realities remains an issue of substantial policy 
relevance. Usage of some indicators for instance is based on the presumption that they are 
generally valid (Gries et al., 2009)
2
, notwithstanding recent empirical evidence that not all 
indicators may matter in financial development (Asongu, 2013b).  Furthermore, the absence 
of a consensus on the superiority of financial development indicators, especially the widely 
used proxy for financial depth (Gries et al., 2009) is deserving of research attention.   As far 
as we have reviewed related literature, we suppose the absence of studies that focus on the 
quality of financial development indicators (with respect to contextual development concerns) 
is enough inspiration to search for the missing link. It is the objective of this paper to verify 
the validity of the financial depth indicator as applied to developing countries and hence, 
decompose it into new measures that substantially tackle financial development challenges in 
developing countries. The underlying impetus of the study is the misleading assumption that, 
money supply (financial depth) is a proxy for liquid liabilities in developing countries.  This 
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 Gries et al. (2009) state: “In the related literature, several proxies for financial deepening have been suggested, 
for example, monetary aggregates such as M2 on GDP. To date there is no consensus on the superiority of any 
indicator” (p. 1851).  
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paper will therefore suggest a practicable way to disentangle the effects of the various 
financial sectors on economic development. We shall develop testable hypotheses and 
propositions for more refined financial development indicators and empirically verify their 
validity in the finance-inequality nexus. GDP and Money-supply oriented ratios are developed 
for each sector of the financial system. Our conception of the financial system goes beyond 
the realm of that expressed in the International Financial Statistics’ definition: it integrates the 
informal sector, hitherto a missing component in the existing measurement of monetary 
supply (M2).  
 The contribution of this paper to the finance-inequality literature is threefold.  (1) It 
provides a macroeconomic assessment of the income-redistributive incidence of the informal 
financial sector. (2) The existing measurement of financial depth is disentangled to include a 
previously missing component and, the income-equalizing effect of each component is 
examined independently. (3) Financial sector importance measures are introduced to 
complement GDP-based indicators in order to investigate the dynamics of financial sector 
competition in the finance-inequality nexus.  
The outcome of this study could be interesting to policy makers and researchers 
because, it unites two streams of research. It contributes at the same time to the 
macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and, responds to the growing 
field of economic development by means of informal financial sector promotion and 
microfinance (Asongu, 2013cd, 2014a). The absence of sound fundamentals in a financial 
indicator might lead to inappropriate inferences and unhealthy policy recommendations. The 
rest of the paper is structured in the following manner.  Section 2 examines the problem 
statement and the proposed solutions from the literature. Data and methodology are presented 
and outlined respectively in Section 3. Presentation of results, discussion and policy 
recommendations are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5. 
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2. Problem statement and solutions  
A shortcoming in the definition of the financial system by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) is core to this problem statement because it is more adapted to developed 
countries. According to the International Financial Statistics (IFS), the financial system 
consists of the formal and semi-formal sectors; that is, deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions (see lines 24, 25 and 45 of the IFS, 2008). While this definition could be 
quasi-true for developed countries, it fails to take account of the informal financial sector in 
undeveloped countries. This begs the concern of knowing the role of the informal sector (in 
economic development).  
 
2.1 The International Financial Statistics’ (2008) conception of the financial system  
As detailed in Table 1 below inspired by Steel (2006), formal finance refers to services 
that are regulated by the central bank and other supervisory authorities. Semi-formal finance 
enables a distinction between formal and informal finance. This is the segment of finance that 
is in a formal financial environment but not formally recognized. A good example is 
microfinance.  Informal finance is one that is not arranged via formal agreements and not 
enforced through the legal system. From the fourth column, the last two types of ‘saving and 
lending’ are very common in developing countries, particularly among the financially 
excluded or those on low incomes. Unfortunately, the IFS definition completely marginalizes 
the last types. We postulate that, based on the weight of available evidence, informal finance 
should no longer be undermined in the definition of the financial system.  
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Table 1: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context  
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients 
 
Formal 
financial 
system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF  
Definition of 
Financial 
System from 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS) 
 
Formal 
Financial 
sector 
(Deposit 
Banks) 
 
Formal 
banks 
 
 
 
 
Licensed by 
central bank 
 
Commercial 
and 
development 
banks  
 
Large businesses, 
Government 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Semi-
formal  
and 
informal 
financial 
systems 
 
 
 
Semi-formal 
financial 
sector 
(Other 
Financial 
Institutions) 
Specialized 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit taking 
Micro Finance 
banks  
 
Large rural 
enterprises, Salaried 
Workers, Small and 
medium enterprises  
 
 
Other non-
bank 
financial 
institutions 
Legally 
registered but 
not licensed as 
financial 
institution by 
central bank and 
government 
 
 
Credit Unions, 
Micro Finance 
NGOs 
 
 
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial 
poor 
 
 
Missing 
component 
in IFS 
definition 
 
 
Informal 
financial 
sector 
 
 
Informal 
banks 
Not legally 
registered at 
national level 
(though may be 
linked  to a 
registered 
association) 
 
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money lenders 
 
 
 
Self-employed poor 
Source Author 
 
2.2 Rethinking financial development indicators   
As far as we have reviewed, but for Beck et al. (1999), the absence of studies that 
underline the quality of financial development indicators with regard to contextual 
development is a significant missing component in the financial development literature. Some 
studies have identified the issue, but fallen short of addressing it. Hence, it has been well 
documented that the financial depth indicator as applied to developing countries is very 
misleading as it does not integrate the realities and challenges of financial intermediary 
development (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Khumbhakar & Mavrotas, 2005; Ang & 
McKibbin, 2007; Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn, 2008). Therefore, a motivation of this work hinges 
on an existing debate over the contextual quality of financial development indicators. 
Accordingly, as we shall cover the first generation solutions before proposing second 
generation solutions.  
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2.2.1 First generation solutions  
 As far as we have reviewed, first generation solutions consist of a class of studies that 
has identified the issue with the IFS definition of the financial system and tried to address it 
superficially without given due consideration to the informal financial sector. The kernel of 
this categorization is that, while trying to address the issue, informal finance is still 
marginalized. Money supply (M2) which represents the money stock has been widely 
employed as a standard measurement of liquid liabilities in many studies for decades (World 
Bank, 1989; King & Levine, 1993). While, this indicator is quasi-true in the developed world, 
its application to developing countries has faced substantial criticisms. Critics have stressed 
that in developing countries; an improvement in M2 may reflect an extensive use of currency 
rather than an increase in bank deposits (liquid liabilities).  In attempts to address this problem 
in empirical literature, a number of solutions have been suggested.  
Firstly, in a bid to curtail this shortcoming, Demetriades & Hussein (1996) have 
proposed the subtraction of currency outside banks from M2 when measuring liquid liabilities 
in developing countries. Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn (2008) amongst others have recently 
followed suit in adjusting M2. However, these adjustments have not emphasized financial 
sector importance, because the informal financial sector has still been ruled-out as marginal in 
the adjustment.  
 Secondly, some authors have sought to address the concern by determining a variable 
that broadly takes account of financial depth. They have used the first principal component of 
money supply and a combination of other financial measures (Khumbhakar & Mavrotas, 
2005; Ang & McKibbin, 2007; Gries et al., 2009). In so doing, they have decreased the 
dimensionality of the set of variables without losing much information from the initial dataset 
on the one hand; and on the other hand, decreased problems related to the quality of M2 as a 
proxy for liquid liabilities. However, the main drawback of this approach is that for the most 
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part, M2 is mixed with concepts of financial activity (private domestic credit), financial size 
(deposit bank assets/central bank assets plus deposit bank assets), financial allocation 
efficiency (bank credit/bank deposits)…etc.  
 
2.2.2. Second generation solutions 
We propose second generation solutions in Table 2 below which is a practical way of 
disentangling the effects of formal, semi-formal and informal financial development sectors 
contained in M2. Propositions in Table 2 are based on a rethinking of the IFS definition of the 
financial system. Hence, the new definition integrates a previously missing informal financial 
sector component into the definition of the financial system. It disentangles the existing 
measurement into formal and semiformal financial sectors. Moreover, it proposes measures of 
financial sector importance that appreciate evidence of financial sector competition. These 
second generation solutions are consistent with a growing stream of literature on financial 
sector competition (Asongu, 2014bcd).  
 
Table 2: Summary of propositions 
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators 
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation 
Proposition  1 Formal  financial 
development  
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits3  here refer to demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks. 
Proposition  2 Semi-formal  
financial development 
(Financial deposits – Bank 
deposits)/ GDP 
Financial deposits4 are demand, time and saving 
deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions. 
Proposition  3 Informal  financial 
development 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/GDP 
 
 
Proposition  4 
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development  
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP 
 
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance 
Proposition 5 Financial 
intermediary 
formalization 
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply (M2) 
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)5 . 
Proposition 6 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
(Financial deposits - Bank 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-formalization)6. 
                                                 
3
 Lines 24 and 25 of the IFS (October 2008).  
4
 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of the IFS (2008).  
5
 In undeveloped countries M2 is not equal to liquid liabilities (liquid liabilities equal bank deposits: bd). 
Whereas, in undeveloped countries bd/M2<1, in developed countries bd/M2 is almost equal to 1.  This indicator 
measures the rate at which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking system. Financial formalization here 
is defined as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in circulation. 
6
 This indicator measures the level at which the semi-formal financial sector evolves to the detriment of formal 
and informal sectors. 
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formalization’ 
Proposition 7 Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’ 
(Money Supply – Financial 
deposits)/ Money Supply 
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)7. 
Proposition 8 Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’  
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply  
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’ financial 
development: (Semi-formalization and 
informalization) 8 
N.B: Propositions 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector importance. Hence, when 
their time series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment of other sectors and vice-versa.  
 
 
2.3 Scope and positioning of the paper 
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain serious challenges to economic and human 
developments. Financial repression and its pervasiveness of mitigating economic growth has 
been elaborately covered by a substantial bulk of the literature (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973). In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries engaged in a series of structural and 
policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of economic reforms with the goal of given 
impetus to economic growth, as well as improving overall economic and financial efficiency 
(Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). Hitherto, owing to data issues on income-inequality for Africa, 
only two studies to the best of our knowledge have addressed the finance-inequality nexus in 
the continent (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010). A common drawback of these two 
works is the very limited application of the concept of financial development, which we have 
broadened with the propositions in the previous section. Restricting the concept of finance to 
only its dynamics of depth (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al., 2010) and activity (Batuo et al., 
2010) does not paint a full picture of the African inequality-finance nexus for the following 
reasons. Firstly, as we have earlier discussed, a distinction between money supply and liquid 
liabilities in the conception of financial depth is very important in separating the income 
                                                 
7
 This proposition shows the rate at which the informal financial sector is developing at the cost of formal and 
semi-formal sectors.  
8
 The proposition appreciates the deterioration of the formal banking sector to the benefit of other sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be perfectly antagonistic, meaning 
the former (formal financial development at the expense of other sectors) and the later (formal sector 
deterioration) should display a perfectly negative coefficient of correlation (See Appendix 2). Proposition  7 has 
a high positive correlation with Proposition 8 and therefore, only the former will be used in the empirical section.  
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redistributive-effect of ‘bank mobilized funds’ from that of overall money supply9. Secondly, 
it is our conviction that the African finance-inequality nexus cannot be effectively assessed 
without taking into consideration the semi-formal and informal sectors which are more close 
to the poor segments of the population than the formal financial sector. Thirdly, contrary to 
the motivation of Batuo et al. (2010), the effect on inequality of first and second generation 
financial reforms in Africa cannot be limited to formal finance. In light of the above points, 
drawing from the experience of a continent that has been implementing development financial 
reforms, motivated by the propositions highlighted above and shortcomings of existing 
empirical literature on the African inequality nexus, the empirical section of this paper will 
provide additional dimensions to the debate. Hence, the following hypotheses will be tested in 
the empirical section.  
Hypothesis 1: The informal financial sector (a previously missing component in the definition 
of money supply) is good for the poor.  
Hypothesis 2: Disentangling different components of the existing measurement (financial 
system) into formal (banking sector) and semi-formal (other financial institutions) financial 
sector indicators contribute significantly to the finance-inequality nexus debate. 
Hypothesis 3: Introducing measures of sector importance provides interesting dynamics of 
financial sector competition in the finance-inequality nexus. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 We assess a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996 to 2010. The 
limitation to a 15 year span is based on constraints in data availability. Summary statistics 
                                                 
9
 This is because, a great chunk of the monetary base in the African continent circulates outside the banking 
sector, therefore an increase in money supply may reflect the increase in the use of currency rather  than a 
strengthening of financial system deposits. 
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(and presentation of countries), correlation analysis and variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. The summary statistics of the variables 
used in the panel regressions show that, there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized 
so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. Both 
the standard deviations and minimum/maximum values validate this assertion and further lend 
credit to the inappropriateness of a parametric model that assumes a particular functional 
distribution. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to mitigate issues resulting from 
overparametization and multicollinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not 
appear to be any serious problems with respect of the relationships to be estimated.  
 The indicator for inequality is the GINI coefficient which measures disparity among 
values of the frequency income-distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality while 
a coefficient of one expresses maximal inequality. The GINI coefficient which is commonly 
used as a measure of inequality in income or wealth has found application in diverse 
disciplines studying inequality: sociology, economics, health science, agriculture…etc  (Batuo 
et al., 2010).  
Control variables include: inflation, government expenditure, economic prosperity 
(GDP growth), population growth, foreign-aid, human development and globalization (trade 
and foreign direct investment: FDI). We expect: high inflation to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 
2007) while, low inflation should reduce it (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004); government 
expenditure (not tainted by corrupt malpractices) to mitigate inequality and; GDP growth to 
reduce inequality conditional on even-distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity. The 
impact of foreign-aid on inequality is contingent on the quality of institutions. The incidence 
of population growth on inequality should to be positive (AfDB, 2012, p.3). We expect 
globalization both from trade and capital openness perspectives to have a negative income- 
redistributive effect: consistent with recent African inequality literature (Kai & Hamori, 2009, 
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p.15). However from intuition, trade can either increase or decrease inequality depending on 
the proportion of the poor relying on agricultural exports. On the other hand, cheap imports 
could increase savings and hence, indirectly improve the income-distribution of the poor. In 
the same vein, too much imports of ‘substitution goods’ produced by domestic industries 
could fuel income-inequality if majority of the population in the lower-income brackets 
depend substantially on the affected industries for subsistence income. The impact of human 
development on inequality depends on the proportion of the poor in the following three 
dimensions (with respect to national average): GDP per capita, life expectancy and, literacy 
rate.  
  
3.2 Methodology  
Estimation with dynamic panel data has some important advantages and one 
disadvantage relative to cross-country analysis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; Asongu, 
2013e). On the first positive note: (1) it makes use both of time-series and the cross sectional 
variation in the data; (2) in cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect 
is part of the error term, so that correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables results in biased estimated coefficients. More so, in cross-country regressions, if the 
lagged endogenous variable is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific 
effect is certainly correlated with the regressors. A means of controlling for the presence of 
unobserved country-specific effects is to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate 
the country-specific effect, and then employ instrumental variables to take account of 
endogeneity. The endogeneity issue is the second edge of the dynamic panel estimation 
technique. Uncontrolled endogeneity can significantly bias estimates and lead to misleading 
13 
 
inferences. Dynamic panel data analysis accounts for this endogeneity issue by using lagged 
values of exogenous variables as instruments
10
.  
 The principal concern associated with dynamic panel data analysis is the usage of 
data-average over shorter time spans. By implication, the estimated results reveal short-run 
impacts and not long-term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and 
discussing results. In the context our paper, we shall overcome this issue by using both ‘full 
data’ and ‘data averages’ in terms of non-overlapping intervals. For robustness purposes, we 
shall use two-year
11
, three-year
12
 and five-year
13
 non-overlapping intervals.  
 The dynamic panel regression model is expressed as follows: 
 
tititiytixtiti WPIqIq ,,,1,10,                          (1) 
 
 where ‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. Iq  is the inequality rate; 
P , the vector of propositions with 91  x  .  tiW ,  is a vector of control variables  with 
179  y  ,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error 
term. Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the independent variables above demonstrate 
strict exogeneity. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because: (1) while the 
propositions could have substantial incidences on inequality, the reverse effect cannot be 
ruled-out because, the redistributive quality of income in an economy also has some bearing 
on financial sector development
14
; (2)  the propositions could be correlated with the error 
term ( ti , ); (3) country- and time-specific effects could also be correlated with other variables 
                                                 
10
 On a more general note, an indicator is endogenous when it is correlated with the error term. Endogeneity can 
result from simultaneity or omitted variables, autoregression with autocorrelated errors and measurement error. 
In addition, a loop of causality between the independent variable and the dependent parameter results in 
endogeneity.  
11
 We have eight two-year non-overlapping intervals: 1996; 1997-1998; 1999-2000; 2001-2002; 2003-2004; 
2005-2006; 2007-2008; 2009-2010. 
12
 There are five three-year  non-overlapping  intervals: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007; 2008-
2010. 
13
 The corresponding five-year non-overlapping intervals are three: 1996-2000; 2001-2005; 2006-2010.  
14
 From intuition and common sense, increasing inequality is likely to have a more favorable impact on formal 
financial development; since bank accounts are mostly held by the rich.  
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in the model, which is often the case with lagged dependent variables included in the 
equations.  Hence, arises an issue of endogeneity owing to endogenous propositions.  A way 
of dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the 
lagged inequality variables involves eliminating the individual effects by first differencing. 
Therefore, Eq. (1) becomes: 
)()( 1,,2,1,11,,   titixtitititi PPIqIqIqIq  )()()( 1,,11,,   tititttitiy WW    (2) 
                          
However Eq. (2) presents another issue; estimation by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is 
still biased because there remains a correlation between the lagged inequality independent 
variable and the disturbance term. To tackle this issue, we estimate the regression in 
differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation. The procedure uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the 
difference equation, and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the levels 
equation, thus exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged inequality 
variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 
1991) and system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), we 
choose the latter in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, 3-4). The system GMM has been 
confirmed to be better in recent poverty (Arestis & Caner, 2010) and African finance (Batuo 
& Kupulike, 2010) literature. 
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we choose the second-step GMM 
because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the first-step,  the residuals are 
assumed to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is 
crucial as past lagged propositions are to be used as instruments for the dependent variables. 
Also, the estimation depends on the assumption that the lagged values of the inequality 
variable and other propositions are valid instruments in the regression. When the error terms 
of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the differenced 
15 
 
residuals should be significant whereas their second-order auto-correlation: AR(2) should not 
be. The validity of the instruments is examined with the Sargan over-identifying restrictions 
test (OIR). In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM estimation are that it 
does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases of the difference 
estimator in small samples, and it can control for the potential endogeneity of all propositions.  
Beside the control for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, further robustness 
of our models is ensured by the following. (1) Usage of both ‘full data’ and ‘average data’ 
with non-overlapping intervals to capture the long-term and short-run tendencies of estimated 
coefficients respectively. Hence, in addition to the full dataset, we have three categories of 
non-overlapping intervals sub-datasets already discussed in the data section. (2) Employment 
of two system GMM specifications with different control variables
15
.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis  
   
4.1 Presentation of results  
 
 From the estimates presented in Table 3, with respect to Panel A  and Panel B for 
‘GDP-based’ and financial-sector-importance measures respectively, four interpretations are 
common. (1) We notice that initial values of inequality have positive significant signs. 
Coefficients corresponding to these initial values of inequality are less than one, suggesting 
that inequality in converging in Africa; an indication of potential broad and blanket inequality 
reduction policy measures. Discussing the speed of convergence and time required to achieve 
full conditional convergence will be out of scope. However, it is worthwhile highlighting that, 
conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we model or empirical test. Hence, 
based on the propositions, it could be inferred that countries with low inequality rates are 
catching-up their counterparts with higher rates (conditional on the propositions). (2) But for 
the two-year and five-year NOI, the report of the serial correlation test used to examine the 
                                                 
15
 We had wished to use a poverty headcount indicator as the alternative measure of inequality but the available 
data from World Development Indicators is so scanty and/or substantially short of degrees of freedom.  
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null hypothesis of no serial correlation of residual in first-difference, confirms the estimations 
do not suffer from serial correlation issues. While evidence for serial correlation is thin for the 
two-year NOI (at a 10% significance level), the AR(2) test is not feasible for the five-year 
NOI owing to constraints in degrees of freedom. Hence, results of the five-year NOI will be 
purely informative and not object of any inferences for the benefit of doubt. (3) The Sargan 
OIR test for the validity of the instruments compares the sample moment conditions with their 
population analog. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, the lagged differences 
of the propositions and control variables are uncorrelated with the errors in the level 
equations. In other words, the instruments explain inequality through no other mechanisms 
beside the proposed channels, conditional on other covariates (control variables). The 
overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test (across specifications and 
panels) points to the validity of the instruments. (4) The Wald test for the joint significance of 
estimated coefficients also provides appealing results at the 1% significance level.  
 
4.2 Discussion of results 
 
Based on Panel A of Table 3, the following conclusions could be drawn. (1) The 
formal, semi-formal, and informal financial sectors all have negative incidences on inequality. 
This implies, all financial sectors have a positive income redistributive effect. Ultimately, 
improvement in financial sector shares relative to economic prosperity (GDP growth) is good 
for the poor. The intuition behind this interpretation is twofold. On the one hand, holding 
GDP growth and other things constant, financial development which is a constituent of GDP 
growth will mitigate poverty by its equalizing effect on income-distribution. On the other 
hand, if the share of financial sector development in GDP growth is greater in comparison to 
other macroeconomic components of GDP growth, the direct effect on income distribution 
will be an equalizing one.  Ultimately, the equalizing income-effect of financial sector 
measures (that are relative to GDP) is consistent with recent African finance-inequality 
17 
 
literature (Batuo et al., 2010).  From a broad perspective, the findings are also in line with 
empirical (Beck et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009) and theoretical (Galor & 
Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993) literature which postulate a negative and linear 
relationship between financial development and income-inequality. (2) As for the control 
variables, human development increases inequality while population growth mitigates it. The 
negative impact of human development on inequality implies a diminishing proportion of the 
following three dimensions (with respect to national average) to the poor: GDP per capita, life 
expectancy and literacy rate. The finding on population growth diminishing inequality which 
is not in line with AfDB (2012) confirms the expected relationship from the correlation 
matrix.  
From Panel B of Table 3, the following could be established. (1) Growth of formal 
finance at the expense of informal and semi-formal finance has an income-disequalizing 
effect. This is logical from common sense because, the increase in bank deposits (liquid 
liabilities) in the formal banking sector can only result from the fruits of the population 
faction in possession of bank accounts. In developing countries, this segment of the 
population with bank accounts constitute the upper-income and middle-income brackets. By 
implication, when growth in money supply (M2) or an extensive use of currency in an 
economy transits through the banking sector to the detriment of the informal and semi-formal 
financial sectors, the natural consequence is rising inequality. This conclusion could be 
substantiated with present-day statistics of most formal institutions concentrated in the urban 
areas of less developed countries. With a great proportion of the poor domiciled in rural areas 
without access to bank accounts, the competitive advantage of formal banking in shares of M2 
is not good for the poor.  (2) When the share of the semi-formal financial sector in money 
supply improves to the detriment of the formal and informal sectors, the effect on the poor is 
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positive. (3) Growth of the informal financial sector to the detriment of the formal and semi-
formal sectors is also good for the poor.  
4. 3 Robustness checks  
 
 Findings of Table 3 have one particular short-coming. Discussions relevant to 
Propositions 3, 4 (Panel A), 5 and 7 (Panel B) are purely of informative character because 
they are based on findings from the five-year NOI dataset. We earlier stated that, because the 
five-year NOI specification was short of a second-order autocorrelation test, inference could 
not be based on the findings for the benefit of doubt and justice to the system GMM approach. 
Consequently, we use different control variables and replicate the regressions in Table 3. The 
findings in Table 4 show Propositions 3 and 4 of Panel A and, Propositions 5 and 7 of Panel B 
are significant outside the five-year NOI specification columns. We are unable to use 
Propositions 5, 6 and 7 in the same equation because Propositions 5 and 7 have a correlation 
of -0.974 (see Appendix 2). Overwhelming failure to reject the null hypotheses of AR(2) and 
Sargan OIR tests points to the absence of autocorrelation and validity of the instruments 
respectively. Beside these positive specification points, overwhelming rejection of the null 
hypotheses of the Wald tests for joint significance of estimated coefficients confirms the 
quality of overall model specification and hence, the substance of inferences based on 
estimated propositions. The discussion of results in Table 3 is relevant for Table 4. However, 
one additional point is worth mentioning from Panel B: the inequality mitigation effect of the 
semi-formal financial sector is higher in comparison to the informal sector. The explanation to 
this is a simple one: the semi-formal sector engages in more poverty reduction initiatives than 
the informal sector (see Table 1).  
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Table 3: Two-step System GMM estimates (Dependent variable: Inequality)  
 Panel A: Impact of GDP based Measures   
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  10.548*** 10.556*** 8.248 8.280 9.640 9.640 25.688** 25.688** 
 (4.025) (4.025) (1.115) (1.152) (0.917) (0.917) (2.057) (2.057) 
GINI_1 0.787*** 0.787*** 0.840*** 0.840*** 0.848*** 0.848*** 0.446** 0.446** 
 (14.91) (14.88) (5.982) (6.142) (3.939) (3.939) (2.567) (2.567) 
Proposition 1 -2.556* -2.553* -1.319 -1.332 -0.692 -0.692 -6.861 -6.861 
 (-1.695) (-1.695) (-0.425) (-0.443) (-0.383) (-0.383) (-0.829) (-0.829) 
Proposition 2 -4.071 -3.218 -29.459 -26.562 -101.53** -87.61** -10.268 50.533 
 (-0.137) (-0.100) (-0.731) (-0.610) (-2.279) (-2.046) (-0.064) (0.323) 
Proposition 3 -0.881 --- -3.803 --- -13.91 --- -60.801** --- 
 (-0.235)  (-0.267)  (-0.714)  (-2.006)  
Proposition 4 --- -0.859 --- -3.641 --- -13.919 --- -60.801** 
  (-0.2302)  (-0.256)  (-0.714)  (-2.006) 
Economic Prosperity  0.016 0.016 0.072 0.071 0.172 0.172 -0.042 -0.042 
 (0.419) (0.419) (0.710) (0.683) (1.083) (1.083) (-0.165 (-0.165) 
Population  Growth  -0.362 -0.361 -0.334 -0.339 -1.192* -1.192* -2.555** -2.555** 
 (-0.964) (-0.964) (-0.513) (-0.536) (-1.871) (-1.871) (-2.183) (-2.183) 
Foreign Aid -0.035 -0.035 -0.056 -0.055 -0.034 -0.034 ---  
 (-1.182) (-1.181) (-1.411) (-1.409) (-0.562) (-0.562)   
Human Development  0.077* 0.077* 0.019 0.018 --- --- 21.422* 21.422* 
 (1.773) (1.778) (0.422) (0.425)   (1.661) (1.661) 
Test for AR(2) errors -1.007 -1.007 -1.783* -1.798* 0.002 0.002 n.a n.a 
 [0.313] [0.313] [0.074] [0.072] [0.998] [0.998]   
Sargan  OIR test  15.972 15.978 16.729 16.758 11.566 11.566 0.011 0.011 
 [1.000] [1.000] [0.917] [0.916] [0.171] [0.171] [0.916] [0.916] 
Wald (joint) test 317. 1*** 316.93*** 177.19*** 209.99*** 543.63*** 543.63*** 191.37*** 191.37*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments  60 60 35 35 16 16 9 9 
Countries  24 24 24 24 26 26 15 15 
Observations  234 234 123 123 79 79 30 30 
         
 Panel B: Impact of measures of financial sector importance  
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  5.793* 7.876*** 8.586** 7.180 11.220 5.970 13.397 35.782* 
 (1.730) (3.432) (1.985) (1.492) (1.543) (0.646) (0.732) (1.677) 
GINI_1 0.838*** 0.838*** 0.828*** 0.827*** 0.857*** 0.857*** 0.458** 0.458** 
 (16.43) (16.37) (7.802) (7.480) (4.108) (4.108) (2.056) (2.056) 
Proposition 5 2.075 --- -1.465 --- -5.250 --- 22.384** --- 
 (0.946)  (-0.453)  (-0.927)  (2.237)  
Proposition 6 -8.072* -10.096* -15.752 -14.010 -26.651** -21.400** -77.713 -100.09 
 (-1.871) (-1.948) (-1.498) (-1.262) (-2.348) (-2.389) (-0.913) (-1.172) 
Proposition 7 --- -2.059 --- 1.433 --- 5.250 --- -22.384** 
  (-0.941)  (0.445)  (0.927)  (-2.237) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- 0.047 0.049 0.117 0.117 -0.404 -0.404 
   (0.385) (0.377) (0.462) (0.462) (-1.224) (-1.224) 
Population  Growth  -0.137 -0.149 -0.121 -0.129 -1.042 -1.042 0.422 0.422 
 (-0.539) (-0.533) (-0.246) (-0.265) (-1.031) (-1.031) (0.217) (0.217) 
Foreign Aid --- --- -0.039 -0.039 0.007 0.007 -0.206** -0.206** 
   (-1.439) (-1.436) (0.125) (0.125) (-2.377) (-2.377) 
Human Development  --- --- 0.046 0.050 0.105* 0.105* -11.483 -11.483 
   (1.190) (1.315) (1.746) (1.746) (-0.567) (-0.567) 
Test for AR(2) errors -0.941 -0.944 -1.770* -1.770* -1.023 -1.023 n.a n.a 
 [0.346] [0.344] [0.076] [0.076] [0.306] [0.306]   
Sargan  OIR test  20.673 20.705 17.588 17.615 11.125 11.125 0.006 0.006 
 [1.000] [1.000] [0.890] [0.889] [0.194] [0.194] [0.936] [0.936] 
Wald(joint) test 327*** 326.08*** 231.6*** 263.59*** 4160.2*** 4160.2*** 87.193*** 87.193*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments  59 59 34 34 16 16 9 9 
Countries  27 27 24 24 22 22 15 15 
Observations  270 270 123 123 67 67 30 30 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values.  NOI: Non Overlapping Intervals. 
OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. GINI_1: lagged GINI index. n.a: the second-order autocorrelation test is not applicable owing to 
constraints in degrees of freedom with the five-year NOI dataset.  
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 4: Two-step System GMM estimates (Dependent variable: Inequality)  
 Panel A: Impact of GDP based Measures   
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  7.994 7.993 14.193** 14.203** 16.057** 16.057** 36.463** 36.463** 
 (1.379) (1.376) (1.999) (1.998) (1.972) (1.972) (2.528) (2.528) 
GINI_1 0.802*** 0.802*** 0.695*** 0.695*** 0.646*** 0.646*** 0.195 0.195 
 (7.406) (7.394) (4.648) (4.642) (3.681) (3.681) (0.678) (0.678) 
Proposition 1 -0.622 -0.624 2.442 2.440 3.024 3.024 6.735 6.735 
 (-0.260) (-0.260) (1.248) (1.247) (1.401) (1.401) (1.170) (1.170) 
Proposition 2 13.178 21.060 -40.564 -14.819 -83.319 -49.388 -14.798 71.453 
 (0.306) (0.490) (-1.104) (-0.404) (-1.135) (-0.630) (-0.062) (0.285) 
Proposition 3 -8.168 --- -25.674** --- -33.930** --- -86.251*** --- 
 (-0.494)  (-2.044)  (-2.021)  (-3.287)  
Proposition 4 --- -8.189 --- -25.677** --- -33.930** --- -86.251*** 
  (-0.494)  (-2.043)  (-2.021)  (-3.287) 
Inflation   -0.002 -0.002 --- --- --- --- -0.092 -0.092 
 (-0.089) (-0.088)     (-0.916) (-0.916) 
Government Expenditure  0.031 0.031 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.855) (0.855)       
Foreign Direct Investment -0.019 -0.019 -0.014 -0.013 -0.0006 -0.0006 0.488** 0.488** 
 (-0.329) (-0.335) (-0.157) (-0.155) (-0.007) (-0.007) (2.015) (2.015) 
Trade   0.013 0.013 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.409) (1.406)       
Test for AR(2) errors -0.922 -0.922 -1.452 -1.452 0.532 0.532 n.a n.a 
 [0.356] [0.356] [0.146 ] [0.146] [0.594] [0.594]   
Sargan  OIR test  12.09 12.099 18.006 18.013 12.135 12.135 0.0350 0.035 
 [1.000] [1.000] [0.875 ] [0.875] [0.145] [0.145] [0.851] [0.851] 
Wald(joint) test 360.6*** 358.5*** 333.79*** 332.93*** 565.64*** 565.64*** 394.48*** 394.48*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments  58 58 32 32 14 14 8 8 
Countries  20 20 25 25 23 23 16 16 
Observations  183 183 125 125 71 71 32 32 
         
 Panel B: Impact of measures of financial sector importance  
 Full data 2 Year  NOI 3 Year NOI 5 Year NOI 
Constant  6.549 7.323*** 4.267 9.036 2.377 12.632** 1.374 27.520*** 
 (1.584) (3.608) (1.166) (1.593) (1.378) (2.551) (0.287) (3.545) 
GINI_1 0.822*** 0.825*** 0.789*** 0.825*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.392** 0.392** 
 (14.58) (14.85) (6.359) (6.597) (7.610) (7.610) (2.005) (2.005) 
Proposition 5 0.866 --- 6.447* --- 10.254*** --- 26.145*** --- 
 (0.262)  (1.907)  (2.634)  (4.037)  
Proposition 6 -24.638* -25.327* -17.401** -23.631*** -18.858*** -29.113*** -22.313 -48.459 
 (-1.727) (-1.711) (-2.177) (-3.858) (-3.062) (-7.358) (-0.297) (-0.653) 
Proposition 7 --- -0.966 --- -5.616** --- -10.25*** --- -26.145*** 
  (-0.290)  (-2.269)  (-2.634)  (-4.037) 
Inflation   0.036 0.036 -0.0004 -0.019 --- --- --- --- 
 (1.258) (1.227) (-0.016) (-0.387)     
Government Expenditure  0.039 0.039 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (1.476) (1.486)       
Foreign Direct Investment --- --- -0.070 -0.060 -0.024 -0.024 0.260 0.260 
   (-0.381) (-0.492) (-0.340) (-0.340) (1.332) (1.332) 
Trade   --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.002 0.038 0.038 
     (0.150) (0.150) (1.189) (1.189) 
Test for AR(2) errors -0.224 -0.223 -1.173 -1.155 -0.029 -0.029 n.a n.a 
 [0.822] [0.822] [0.240] [0.247] [0.976] [0.976]   
Sargan  OIR test  16.440 16.720 15.300 14.196 7.557 7.557 0.018 0.018 
 [1.000] [1.000 ] [0.951] [0.970] [0.477] [0.477] [0.891] [0.891] 
Wald(joint) test 457.13*** 466.76*** 460.81*** 505.84*** 2386.3*** 2386.3*** 141.79*** 141.79*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Instruments  55 55 32 32 14 14 7 7 
Countries  22 22 25 25 22 22 16 16 
Observations  207 207 120 120 67 67 32 32 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]:P-values.  NOI: Non Overlapping Intervals. 
OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions. GINI_1: lagged GINI index. n.a: the second-order autocorrelation test is not applicable owing to 
constraints in degrees of freedom with the five-year NOI dataset. 
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4.4 Policy recommendations 
 
 The following policy recommendations derived from the findings are relevant to 
governments of sampled countries in particular and developing countries in general. (1) 
Encourage the establishment of formal institutions in rural communities. Why? We have 
found that formal banking development mitigates inequality (Proposition 1). However, formal 
banking development at the expense of other financial sectors increases inequality 
(Proposition 5). It follows that the establishment of formal institutions in rural areas 
dominated by the ‘low-income brackets’ population could have an equalizing income 
redistributive effect. (2) Favor the establishment of (specialized) non-bank financial 
institutions and informal banks, especially in rural and poor-dominated urban areas
16
. Why? 
Our results have shown that Proposition 3, 4, 6 and 7 have income equalizing effects. (3) 
Semi-formal finance is more poor friendly than informal finance, implying specialized bank 
and non-bank financial institutions are more pro-poor than informal banks (made-up of: 
savings collectors, savings and credit associations and, money lenders).  
As an overall policy recommendation, the poor should be encouraged to open up bank 
accounts. The significance of the results demonstrates that financial development is essential 
in reducing income inequality in African countries. Widening access to non-formal financial 
intermediary markets, especially by targeting those at the lower income strata and the rural 
population would help reduce the persistent income gap between the rural and urban 
population. One possible way of improving financial access to the poor is to oriented policy 
towards the reduction of information asymmetries that increase the operating cost of financial 
institutions. Access to finance by the poor will enable productive investments (e.g in 
education and small manufacturing) which in time could improve equality. Particularly micro-
                                                 
16
Specialized non-bank financial institutions include: Rural banks, Post banks, Saving and Loan Companies and, 
Deposit-taking Micro Finance banks. Non-bank financial institutions are: Credit Unions and Micro Finance 
NGOs. Informal banks (Savings collectors, Savings and credit associations, Money lenders).  
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finance (part of the semi-formal sector) should be encouraged because, at least in its initial 
stage, can thrive without relying heavily on government regulation or strong legal institutions 
that require the poor to borrow contingent on their assets.  
  
5. Conclusion 
 
Financial development indicators are often applied to countries/regions without taking 
into account specific financial development realities. Financial depth in the perspective of 
money supply is not equal to liquid liabilities in every development context.  This paper has 
introduced complementary indicators to the existing Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD). The work unites two streams of research. It contributes at the same time to 
the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responds to the 
growing field of economic development by means of informal financial sector promotion and 
microfinance. The paper suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of the various 
financial sectors on economic development. Our results suggest that, from an absolute 
standpoint (GDP base measures), all financial sectors are pro-poor. However, three interesting 
findings are drawn from measures of sector importance. (1) The expansion of the formal 
financial sector to the detriment of other financial sectors has a disequalizing income-effect. 
(2) The expansion of informal and semi-formal financial sectors at the expense of the formal 
financial sector has an income equalizing effect. (3) The positive income redistributive effect 
of semi-formal finance in financial sector competition is higher than the corresponding impact 
of informal finance.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
       
Inequality GINI  Coefficient 43.104 6.828 29.760 67.400 356 
       
GDP-based 
financial 
development 
indicators   
Proposition 1 0.255 0.204 0.036 0.935 363 
Proposition 2 0.003 0.010 -0.007 0.097 419 
Proposition 3 0.050 0.055 -0.292 0.198 419 
Proposition 4 0.053 0.057 -0.290 0.244 419 
       
 
Measures of 
financial sector   
Proposition 5 0.749 0.161 0.175 1.456 360 
Proposition 6 0.011 0.036 -0.024 0.224 360 
Proposition 7 0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
Proposition 8  0.238 0.161 -0.457 0.824 360 
       
       
 
 
Control 
Variables  
 
 
Inflation 7.239 9.496 -100.00 46.561 395 
Government Expenditure 4.304 10.670 -34.882 61.364 298 
Human Development 1.913 8.0128 0.204 47.486 341 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Foreign Aid 9.447 8.946 -0.251 54.785 392 
Population growth  2.275 0.741 0.042 4.146 420 
Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic. 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 
Financial (Fin) Dependent Variables Control Variables Dependent 
Variable 
 
GDP-Based Measures Sector Importance Measures Globalisation Economic and Social Considerations  
Prop1 Prop2 Prop3 Prop4 Prop5 Prop6 Prop7 Prop8 FDI Trade Infl GE IHDI GDPg NODA Popg GINI  
1.000 0.076 0.099 0.110 0.598 -0.038 -0.590 -0.590 0.040 0.290 -0.098 -0.02 0.09 0.041 -0.433 -0.61 -0.109 Prop1 
 1.000 0.104 0.278 -0.065 0.884 -0.134 -0.134 -0.08 -0.01 0.066 -0.01 -0.04 0.031 0.006 -0.00 -0.066 Prop2 
  1.000 0.984 -0.606 -0.030 0.613 0.613 -0.05 -0.06 -0.142 0.00 -0.11 -0.06 0.019 -0.00 -0.340 Prop3 
   1.000 -0.597 0.166 0.559 0.559 -0.06 -0.06 0.123 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 0.019 -0.00 -0.340 Prop4 
    1.000 -0.111 -0.974 -0.974 0.158 0.339 0.060 0.05 0.18 0.071 -0.332 -0.39 0.322 Prop5 
     1.000 -0.111 -0.111 -0.09 -0.02 0.194 -0.04 -0.03 0.019 0.134 0.10 -0.045 Prop6 
      1.000 1.000 -0.13 -0.33 -0.105 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 -0.311 Prop7 
       1.000 -0.13 -0.33 -0.105 -0.05 -0.17 -0.07 0.301 0.36 -0.311 Prop8 
        1.000 0.470 -0.302 0.07 -0.03 0.095 -0.015 -0.15 0.094 FDI 
         1.000 -0.110 0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.25 -0.42 0.144 Trade 
          1.000 -0.17 0.04 0.021 0.178 0.09 0.044 Infl 
           1.00 -0.22 0.214 0.040 0.02 0.090 GE 
            1.00 -0.05 -0.095 0.01 0.179 IHDI 
             1.000 0.158 0.23 -0.148 GDPg 
              1.000 0.50 -0.175 NODA 
               1.000 -0.199 Popg 
                1.000 GINI 
Prop: Proposition. Infl: Inflation. GE: Government Expenditure. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: GDP growth rate. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance.  Popg: Population 
growth rate.  GINI: Inequality coefficient. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Inequality Dependent variable  
 
Inequality  GINI GINI Coefficient  WDI (World Bank) 
    
    
Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (Annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Expenditure GE Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Foreign-Aid  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Financial Liberalization  FDI  Foregin Direct Investment (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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